https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/issue/feed AIS Transactions on Enterprise Systems 2026-06-19T04:49:15+00:00 Jasmin Fattah-Weil jasmin.fattah-weil@wi.uni-potsdam.de Open Journal Systems <p>The objective of the online journal 'AIS Transaction on Enterprise Systems' (AIS-TES) is to connect researchers, practitioners and students in the field of enterprise systems to one innovative community and promote and encourage knowledge exchange. Scientists from all over the world can publish their articles and stay in dialogue with colleagues and industry. It also aims at discovering and defining new directions of research and topics. AIS Transaction on Enterprise Systems is an international open access online journal with an issue appearing every six months. Contributions addressing any topic regarding enterprise systems are welcome. AIS Transaction on Enterprise Systems publishes original papers, case studies and reviews. Submitted articles must not have been previously published or currently submitted for journal publication elsewhere. This journal is released in association with the <span id="ctl00_PageContent_lblProductName"><a href="https://aisnet.org/page/AISSIGs#collapseSixteen">SIG Enterprise-level Information Systems (SIG ENTSYS)</a> </span>of the <a href="https://aisnet.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Association for Information Systems</a></p> https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/article/view/57 Beyond Phishing: Detecting MFA Fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle at Scale 2026-06-19T04:49:15+00:00 Paul Hernandez researchermvgkel@gmail.com <p>This study proposes a defender-centric strategy to detect and contain two fast-rising attack patterns—MFA fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM)—without relying on expensive tooling. We introduce a lightweight pipeline that fuses identity telemetry (push frequency anomalies, impossible travel), web gateway indicators (suspicious reverse-proxy domains), and endpoint signals (token theft heuristics) into actionable detections. Evaluated across 15 small-to-medium organizations, the approach reduced median time-to-detect by 63% and cut successful account takeovers by 41% over eight weeks. We document failure modes (e.g., noisy travel baselines), provide hardening tips (phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, token binding), and publish query patterns that can be adapted to common SIEM/XDR platforms. The results indicate that defenders can meaningfully blunt modern phishing and session-hijacking campaigns with modest engineering effort and targeted telemetry enrichment.</p> Copyright (c) https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/article/view/56 Beyond Phishing: Detecting MFA Fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle at Scale 2026-06-18T06:37:35+00:00 Lisa Jones authorn2r6a5@tempmail.org <p>This study proposes a defender-centric strategy to detect and contain two fast-rising attack patterns—MFA fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM)—without relying on expensive tooling. We introduce a lightweight pipeline that fuses identity telemetry (push frequency anomalies, impossible travel), web gateway indicators (suspicious reverse-proxy domains), and endpoint signals (token theft heuristics) into actionable detections. Evaluated across 15 small-to-medium organizations, the approach reduced median time-to-detect by 63% and cut successful account takeovers by 41% over eight weeks. We document failure modes (e.g., noisy travel baselines), provide hardening tips (phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, token binding), and publish query patterns that can be adapted to common SIEM/XDR platforms. The results indicate that defenders can meaningfully blunt modern phishing and session-hijacking campaigns with modest engineering effort and targeted telemetry enrichment.</p> Copyright (c) https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/article/view/55 Beyond Phishing: Detecting MFA Fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle at Scale 2026-05-28T16:25:14+00:00 Maria Young academic56worf@outlook.com <p>This study proposes a defender-centric strategy to detect and contain two fast-rising attack patterns—MFA fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM)—without relying on expensive tooling. We introduce a lightweight pipeline that fuses identity telemetry (push frequency anomalies, impossible travel), web gateway indicators (suspicious reverse-proxy domains), and endpoint signals (token theft heuristics) into actionable detections. Evaluated across 15 small-to-medium organizations, the approach reduced median time-to-detect by 63% and cut successful account takeovers by 41% over eight weeks. We document failure modes (e.g., noisy travel baselines), provide hardening tips (phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, token binding), and publish query patterns that can be adapted to common SIEM/XDR platforms. The results indicate that defenders can meaningfully blunt modern phishing and session-hijacking campaigns with modest engineering effort and targeted telemetry enrichment.</p> Copyright (c) https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/article/view/54 Beyond Phishing: Detecting MFA Fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle at Scale 2026-05-26T10:22:44+00:00 John Adams researchermsvq6i@hotmail.com <p>This study proposes a defender-centric strategy to detect and contain two fast-rising attack patterns—MFA fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM)—without relying on expensive tooling. We introduce a lightweight pipeline that fuses identity telemetry (push frequency anomalies, impossible travel), web gateway indicators (suspicious reverse-proxy domains), and endpoint signals (token theft heuristics) into actionable detections. Evaluated across 15 small-to-medium organizations, the approach reduced median time-to-detect by 63% and cut successful account takeovers by 41% over eight weeks. We document failure modes (e.g., noisy travel baselines), provide hardening tips (phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, token binding), and publish query patterns that can be adapted to common SIEM/XDR platforms. The results indicate that defenders can meaningfully blunt modern phishing and session-hijacking campaigns with modest engineering effort and targeted telemetry enrichment.</p> Copyright (c) https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/article/view/53 Beyond Phishing: Detecting MFA Fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle at Scale 2026-05-16T14:25:59+00:00 James Moore author2cnpdk@hotmail.com <p>This study proposes a defender-centric strategy to detect and contain two fast-rising attack patterns—MFA fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM)—without relying on expensive tooling. We introduce a lightweight pipeline that fuses identity telemetry (push frequency anomalies, impossible travel), web gateway indicators (suspicious reverse-proxy domains), and endpoint signals (token theft heuristics) into actionable detections. Evaluated across 15 small-to-medium organizations, the approach reduced median time-to-detect by 63% and cut successful account takeovers by 41% over eight weeks. We document failure modes (e.g., noisy travel baselines), provide hardening tips (phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, token binding), and publish query patterns that can be adapted to common SIEM/XDR platforms. The results indicate that defenders can meaningfully blunt modern phishing and session-hijacking campaigns with modest engineering effort and targeted telemetry enrichment.</p> Copyright (c) https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/article/view/51 Beyond Phishing: Detecting MFA Fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle at Scale 2026-04-23T20:04:15+00:00 Karen Rivera userfof7qr@outlook.com <p>This study proposes a defender-centric strategy to detect and contain two fast-rising attack patterns—MFA fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM)—without relying on expensive tooling. We introduce a lightweight pipeline that fuses identity telemetry (push frequency anomalies, impossible travel), web gateway indicators (suspicious reverse-proxy domains), and endpoint signals (token theft heuristics) into actionable detections. Evaluated across 15 small-to-medium organizations, the approach reduced median time-to-detect by 63% and cut successful account takeovers by 41% over eight weeks. We document failure modes (e.g., noisy travel baselines), provide hardening tips (phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, token binding), and publish query patterns that can be adapted to common SIEM/XDR platforms. The results indicate that defenders can meaningfully blunt modern phishing and session-hijacking campaigns with modest engineering effort and targeted telemetry enrichment.</p> Copyright (c) https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/article/view/50 Beyond Phishing: Detecting MFA Fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle at Scale 2026-04-21T12:36:28+00:00 Brenda Diaz userdwxwbc@outlook.com <p>This study proposes a defender-centric strategy to detect and contain two fast-rising attack patterns—MFA fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM)—without relying on expensive tooling. We introduce a lightweight pipeline that fuses identity telemetry (push frequency anomalies, impossible travel), web gateway indicators (suspicious reverse-proxy domains), and endpoint signals (token theft heuristics) into actionable detections. Evaluated across 15 small-to-medium organizations, the approach reduced median time-to-detect by 63% and cut successful account takeovers by 41% over eight weeks. We document failure modes (e.g., noisy travel baselines), provide hardening tips (phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, token binding), and publish query patterns that can be adapted to common SIEM/XDR platforms. The results indicate that defenders can meaningfully blunt modern phishing and session-hijacking campaigns with modest engineering effort and targeted telemetry enrichment.</p> Copyright (c) https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/article/view/49 Beyond Phishing: Detecting MFA Fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle at Scale 2026-03-17T05:13:21+00:00 Ryan Phillips scholargtqwoj@tempmail.org <p>This study proposes a defender-centric strategy to detect and contain two fast-rising attack patterns—MFA fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM)—without relying on expensive tooling. We introduce a lightweight pipeline that fuses identity telemetry (push frequency anomalies, impossible travel), web gateway indicators (suspicious reverse-proxy domains), and endpoint signals (token theft heuristics) into actionable detections. Evaluated across 15 small-to-medium organizations, the approach reduced median time-to-detect by 63% and cut successful account takeovers by 41% over eight weeks. We document failure modes (e.g., noisy travel baselines), provide hardening tips (phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, token binding), and publish query patterns that can be adapted to common SIEM/XDR platforms. The results indicate that defenders can meaningfully blunt modern phishing and session-hijacking campaigns with modest engineering effort and targeted telemetry enrichment.</p> Copyright (c) https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/article/view/47 Beyond Phishing: Detecting MFA Fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle at Scale 2026-03-16T09:39:04+00:00 Dorothy Lee authorz8mdse@outlook.com <p>This study proposes a defender-centric strategy to detect and contain two fast-rising attack patterns—MFA fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM)—without relying on expensive tooling. We introduce a lightweight pipeline that fuses identity telemetry (push frequency anomalies, impossible travel), web gateway indicators (suspicious reverse-proxy domains), and endpoint signals (token theft heuristics) into actionable detections. Evaluated across 15 small-to-medium organizations, the approach reduced median time-to-detect by 63% and cut successful account takeovers by 41% over eight weeks. We document failure modes (e.g., noisy travel baselines), provide hardening tips (phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, token binding), and publish query patterns that can be adapted to common SIEM/XDR platforms. The results indicate that defenders can meaningfully blunt modern phishing and session-hijacking campaigns with modest engineering effort and targeted telemetry enrichment.</p> Copyright (c) https://aes-journal.com/index.php/ais-tes/article/view/45 Beyond Phishing: Detecting MFA Fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle at Scale 2026-03-03T16:54:30+00:00 Sarah Thomas scholarcvopp9@yahoo.com <p>This study proposes a defender-centric strategy to detect and contain two fast-rising attack patterns—MFA fatigue and Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM)—without relying on expensive tooling. We introduce a lightweight pipeline that fuses identity telemetry (push frequency anomalies, impossible travel), web gateway indicators (suspicious reverse-proxy domains), and endpoint signals (token theft heuristics) into actionable detections. Evaluated across 15 small-to-medium organizations, the approach reduced median time-to-detect by 63% and cut successful account takeovers by 41% over eight weeks. We document failure modes (e.g., noisy travel baselines), provide hardening tips (phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, token binding), and publish query patterns that can be adapted to common SIEM/XDR platforms. The results indicate that defenders can meaningfully blunt modern phishing and session-hijacking campaigns with modest engineering effort and targeted telemetry enrichment.</p> Copyright (c)